In the unipolar moment that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, capitalist neoliberalism, not really a new phenomenon, swept across the planet, creating conditions for the now seriously compromised phenomenon called globalization – the end of history, some thought.

Migration, itself a fact as old as human history, was caught up in the more general tearing down down of borders and came to be seen, by supporters and opponents alike, as a major constituent of globalization, along with the free movement of goods and capital, the information revolution, the denigration of the nation-state and the universalization of a rights-based political philosophy. Multiculturalism became a reality and even a goal in some richer countries.

Various elements of globalization ended up provoking a strong reaction both from traditional societies and from those sections of the rich countries that found themselves disadvantaged by deindustrialization, rapid cultural change and perceived insecurity. Migration in particular came to be seen by many as more a threat than a prize and developed into a burning political issue. For migration and for other aspects of globalization, history had returned with a vengeance.

Let us take a look at some important migration issues in 2025 and in the years that brought us to where we are.

● Throughout the post-Cold-War era, most governments failed to manage migration. Asia was the big exception. From Japan to Saudi Arabia, including China, strictly enforced systems for migration were the rule. Most Western nations, especially those with a history of colonialism, took a laissez-faire approach. Some had theoretically strict laws but enforced them very loosely and allowed massive illegal entry at the same time.

● The economics of migration encouraged the flow from poorer to richer countries, ever the main magnet of modern migration. Employers often supported migration, which kept wages down in receiving countries. Migrants took on the low-paid jobs that citizens of rich countries no longer wanted.

● Widespread confusion between economic migrants and refugees led to the corruption or breakdown of the asylum systems of most Western countries. It became common on the dominant political left to consider migration as a right, open borders as the norm and every migrant a refugee.

● Assimilation of new migrants proved more difficult than governments expected, with the result that societies within societies proliferated. This was especially true of migrants of races or religions different from the established populations. Multiculturalism was the attempt to put an acceptable face on the problem.

● Opponents of migration insisted that migrants caused increases in crime and insecurity and prison statistics as well as popular sentiment supported this view. In some countries a two-tier justice system evolved in an attempt to paper over the problem. Migrant smuggling grew into a major industry.

● A nationalist push-back took place in developed countries against many of the components of globalization. Migration became a key issue in elections in most democratic countries. Populists and elites came to use migration as a marker in their increasingly polarized political debates.

This is not a pretty picture, and yet migration continues as an essential element in many economies and the pressures to migrate will not disappear. What are the likely prospects for migration in the decades to come?

● Governments and nations subjected to heavy migration flows will seek to close borders and restrict illegal entry, forcing migrants into an approved system of entry.
● Selective migration will continue, especially in highly qualified professions.
● Asylum systems will be scrutinized in an effort to cut back on widespread abuse.
● Transit countries will be offered cash agreements to restrict migrant flows.
● Developing countries are likely to experience dwindling remittance revenue, as first-generation migrants decline in numbers. (Migrant remittances are a huge source of foreign exchange for migrant-sending countries.)
● Circular migration may come into fashion – a system in which migrants are admitted to work for a fixed period of time but then are expected to return to their home country.
● Developed countries will reject the idea of “climate change refugees” and will insist on strategies of adaptation.

It remains to consider whether the decline of globalization might make it possible to create an international system of migration management, as some have desired since migration became a major factor in political, economic and social aspects of international relations. It seems a long shot, given the buffeting the world is already experiencing, but here are some of the elements of such a system.

● Acceptance that every nation has the responsibility to manage migration for its own benefit and the collective good of all nations.
● Willingness to accept the return of its citizens not welcome in a country to which they have traveled.
● Strong measures to put an end to trafficking and smuggling.
● Publication of conditions under which migrants would be accepted, country by country.
● The creation of an on-line international job register, possibly administered by IOM.
● Commitment to align asylum with the refugee convention definitions now largely ignored or alternatively to negotiate a new convention. (The latter option is far from easy.)
● Special provisions for those displaced by war or natural disaster, who are not now covered by the refugee convention.

Brunson McKinley, Saint Nicolas de Véroce, 12 April 2025

Several observations come immediately to mind.

• The “Shiite Arc” that stretched from Iran through majority-Shiite Iraq to Alawite Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon is in tatters.
• Turkey’s influence is dramatically expanded via its sponsorship of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
• Russia’s geopolitical posture is weakened and its bases on the Mediterranean are under threat.
• Much will depend on whether the Sunni forces that expelled Assad can form a stable government or will fight each other, as happened in Libya.
• Refugee outflows from Syria are possible but not inevitable, depending on the policy of the new Syrian government toward minorities.

Looking more deeply, we should ask what impact these developments will have on the overall scenario for the region that the Trump administration will try to put in place in cooperation with Israel, a scenario that goes under the label of the Abraham Accords.

The first Trump Presidency began the process of building a Sunni coalition that recognizes Israel and works with it to weaken Iran.  The ruling parties in the Sunni States are reconciled to American support for Israel and see the advantages in trade and technology of partnership with Israel, even if their people remain on a different line.

What then are the likely next steps in the enlargement of the Abraham Accords?

• Saudi Arabia should recognize Israel as soon as active combat in Gaza and against Hezbollah has played out.
• Riyadh should cooperate with Israel and the United States on a rapid reconstruction effort in Syria with the additional objective of bringing Syria too into full relations with Israel.
• President Trump should broker a reconciliation between Turkey and Israel so as to reestablish the close ties that the two countries once enjoyed.
• A role for Turkey in the settlement of the Ukraine war could help.
• A stick-and-carrot approach to Iran might then induce the régime there to abandon its overt hostility toward Israel, or produce conditions that would allow others to come to power in Teheran.
• A regional peace conference could be called to ratify these steps while offering Russia the possibility of keeping its bases on the Mediterranean.

The successful implementation of this policy would be much in the interest of the people of the region.  Europe, Russia and the United States would all be in the winners column.  China would  no doubt support this plan if regional stability were seen as a way to guarantee energy supplies in the long term.

Brunson McKinley, Diplomat at the State Department, Former U.S. Ambassador, Former Director of the International Organisation for Migration at the UN in Geneva.

Le 8 décembre 2024, la situation en Syrie s’est retournée en l’espace de quelques jours sans coup férir. Presque aucun coup de feu n’a été tiré. Une ribambelle de groupuscules jihadistes (entre 20 et 30 groupes) principalement d’obédience Frères Musulmans, alliés à des survivants de Al Qaeda et de Daech (EI), soutenus par la Turquie d’un côté et Israël de l’autre avec probablement un financement qatariote et un parrain (manipulateur ?) lointain, les USA. La Syrie est revenue aux mains de sunnites après un demi-siècle de dictature alaouite (d’obédience chiite).

Le régime de Bachar El Assad n’a offert aucune résistance. Ni l’armée, ni les services de renseignements, ni le très brutal et tristement célèbre frère de Bachar, Maher, avec ses troupes spéciales n’ont agi ou réagi. Les alliés du régime déchu, la Russie, l’Iran, l’axe de la Résistance (Hezbollah (HA) ou le Haschd ech Chaabi irakien) n’ont pas non plus réagi, ni aidé à part quelques belles paroles.

Cela ressemble étrangement à une pièce de théâtre préparée à l’avance, avec un producteur/metteur en scène, deux acteurs principaux et quelques accessoiristes ayant tous participé à la mise en scène de cette tragi-comédie. Cela a été trop vite pour que l’on ne puisse pas imaginer un « coup monté », qui paraît s’être déroulé comme un conte de fées. D’ailleurs toutes les informations qui ont circulé indiquent que cette bataille se prépare depuis plusieurs mois. Il fallait attendre le feu vert pour appuyer sur le bouton.

Il est venu dès qu’un « cessez-le-feu » a été signé au Liban. Le rideau s’est levé sur la scène, dès le lendemain de la signature de cet accord (pour employer un terme plus exact, un « mandat » américano-français) par HA au Liban. Après le génocide des Palestiniens, autorisé, encouragé et financé par le monde occidental, l’affaiblissement considérable de l’Axe de la Résistance et de l’Iran lui-même.

Peu importe comment la Syrie s’est renversée, ce sont les conséquences de cette action qui sont importantes. C’est un énorme pas en avant que la Pax Americana a franchi avec ce coup de force, un de plus dans l’avancée américaine, c’est-à-dire, la mise en place dans nos régions troubles de ce « Nouveau Moyen-Orient », dont ils rêvent depuis plusieurs décennies. Mais, c’est aussi un grand risque que prennent les Américains avec cette « victoire » facile.

Les acteurs sont nombreux avec des agendas non seulement différents, mais parfois contradictoires. La Turquie et Israël n’ont pas les mêmes objectifs. Les Kurdes et les Jihadistes encore moins. Les Jihadistes entre eux non plus. Certes, les ennemis des USA sont affaiblis, mais sont loin d’avoir disparu de la carte. Ni l’Iran, ni HA, ni la Russie, ni l’Axe de la Résistance n’ont disparu. La Chine est restée prudente durant toute cette période. Même les Alliés, comme l’Arabie Saoudite est restée silencieuse. Israël a son propre agenda (le Grand Israël, « du Nil à l’Euphrate ») qui ne correspond pas nécessairement à celui des américains à moyen ou long terme.

Les répercussions sur les pays voisins et lointains sont encore totalement inconnues et peuvent être aussi très grandes. Je résume très succinctement (une liste à la Prévert) les conséquences potentielles de ce changement de statut en Syrie :

1)    En Syrie même. La transition risque de ne pas se passer aussi pacifiquement que cela en a l’air jusqu’à maintenant. Les divergences entre les factions jihadistes, les velléités d’autonomie des kurdes, les réminiscences de l’ancien régime, les occupations turque et israélienne sont tous des facteurs de déstabilisation potentielle ;

2)    L’Irak craint que cette vague jihadiste ne se répercute chez eux. Les factions irakiennes de l’axe de la résistance craignent des frappes israéliennes, soutenues par des composantes locales anti-iraniennes. De même l’Irak pourrait craindre une résurgence de l’EI ;

3)    HA craint lui aussi d’être combattu autant de l’intérieur, à travers les réfugiés syriens au Liban, ou par un renforcement de l’opposition politique libanaise ou par des bombardements israéliens qui occupent (de manière illégale) le Mont Hermon qui surplombe le Liban ;

4)    Le Liban craint évidemment que si le scénario précédent a lieu, dans le but de porter le coup de « grâce » à HA, que cela ne provoque non seulement des soucis sécuritaires incontrôlables, mais un semblant de mini guerres civiles. Sans oublier que le jihadistes ont pris le contrôle (côté syrien, évidemment) de tous les postes frontières avec le pays, qui souffre déjà de problèmes politiques, économiques, financiers énormes. En plus les Israéliens qui occupent encore une partie du territoire libanais ne semblent pas vouloir quitter à la fin des 60 jours prévus depuis l’instauration du nouveau mandat ;

5)    L’Iran craint encore une frappe israélienne potentielle sur son infrastructure nucléaire ou autre. De même des troubles intérieurs, avec un changement potentiel de régime ;

6)    La Jordanie craint également autant la contagion du Jihadisme chez eux, que de l’annexion de la Cisjordanie par Netanyahou, dès la prise de pouvoir de Trump et le renvoi de milliers de Palestiniens vers la Jordanie ;

7)    La Turquie, acteur essentiel et principal de ce renversement de régime, craint des conflits d’abord avec les Kurdes, ensuite des tensions avec Israël, qui, depuis le Mont Hermon, peut observer tout mouvement suspect au moins jusqu’au Sud de la Turquie, mais aussi avec l’OTAN et les USA ;

8)    Israël même, qui a complètement détruit l’infrastructure militaire syrienne, et occupé de nouvelles terres en Syrie où il compte rester au moins jusqu’à fin 2025 peut s’attendre à un nouveau front (peut-être que même il le souhaite ?) ;

9)    Les pays du Golfe qui voient d’un mauvais œil l’apparition de Frères Musulmans, leur bête noire, au pouvoir à Damas, avec le soutien de tout le monde occidental, USA en tête, leur principal allié. Comment feront-ils pour « financer » la reconstruction de la Syrie et que feront-ils des ex-Qaeda et ex-Daech libérés ?

10)  La Russie craint d’être chassée de ses 2 bases militaires syriennes (Humaymim et Tartous). Elle vient d’annoncer que la GB et les USA viennent d’armer l’EI pour mener des opérations « terroristes » contre ces deux bases ;

11)  L’Europe qui craint de voir revenir chez eux des prisonniers politiques (de nationalités européennes) qu’ils avaient qualifié de terroristes (anciens Al Qaeda, EI, Frères Musulmans, etc.). Si de nouveaux troubles importants venaient à s’installer de nouveau en Syrie, une nouvelle vague de réfugiés pourrait se rajouter aux précédentes et leur statut sera encore indécis, alors que l’Europe est en train justement de considérer ne plus vouloir accorder la protection aux anciens réfugiés vu leur reconnaissance du nouveau pouvoir ;

Ce ne sont que certains des problèmes potentiels, peut-être les principaux, qui semblent découler de la situation en Syrie. Il est cependant beaucoup trop tôt pour envisager quoi que ce soit comme analyse sérieuse de ce qui vient de se passer en Syrie et de ses conséquences ces dernières semaines. Je ne m’aventurerai donc pas sur ce terrain encore largement miné par des spéculations de tout genre. Il se pourrait aussi que tout se passe bien, comme cela a l’air de se passer jusqu’à maintenant, comme par magie.

Malek El-Khoury

Beyrouth / Genève le 29.12.24

NB: je signale que la présente analyse (comme toutes les précédentes ou les suivantes) ne concerne qu’un seul et unique aspect de la complexité de la politique moyen-orientale ou mondiale. Il ne faut donc pas la considérer comme complète et exhaustive. La situation est beaucoup plus nuancée que cela.

Je précise également que ceci est ma propre opinion dont j’assume seul la totale responsabilité. 

President Trump’s wish to acquire Greenland is not a crazy whim. It is in fact an extension of a basic American foreign policy and security policy, the Monroe Doctrine. Economic and geopolitical interests are also at play. Let us look at the elements.

The Monroe Doctrine.  Enunciated two centuries ago, long before the United States acquired great-power status, the Monroe Doctrine is fundamental to America’s conception of its place in the world. It decrees that the U.S. will not permit foreign powers to enter the western hemisphere with military force or seek to control territory there. A corollary – not often spoken aloud but clear to all the players – is that the other nations of the western hemisphere are obliged to acknowledge the strategic primacy of the United States and submit to its protection.

In the course of its growth to the status of a world power, U.S. dominance of its own region has always been considered as a precondition for its position in the world. Protected by two great oceans, the U.S. has no fear of attack except by nuclear weapons, a possibility that mutual deterrence has shown to be avoidable. Unchallenged by its neighbors and unless impeded by other powers, U.S. President’s have felt free to project power around the globe, as they did in the late “unipolar moment” and as they may – or may not – seek to do in the future.

So when President Trump couples his embrace of Greenland with stern language directed at Canada, Mexico and Panama, he is to be taken seriously if not literally. The message is a geopolitical one. Because you share the hemisphere with us, you are obliged to listen to us and not act against our interests. When strategic questions arise – base rights, sea lanes, space platforms, energy security – the

U.S. has the final word.

Greenland’s Strategic Importance. As the Arctic ice cap retreats, Greenland becomes an ever more attractive source of mineral wealth, rare earths and petroleum. U.S. companies are already actively seeking exploitation rights. Greenland hosts an important U.S. airbase. Its position in both the North Atlantic and the Arctic convinces U.S.policy makers that the U.S. must deny Greenland’s territory to others. Finding a way to bring Greenland closer to the U.S. and under its arm is a perfectly reasonable economic and strategic goal for America.

The Arctic. The nations with territory in the Arctic are already competing in transport, commerce, intelligence satellites and resource exploitation. Russia has the biggest share of the pie and has promised to share the spoils with China. America’s stake and the claims that derive from it are limited to Alaska. If Greenland could be brought to the negotiating table as a U.S. asset when the Arctic is divided up, it would go far to redressing the imbalance.

Modalities. So how does the U.S. bring Greenland under its control? Not by invasion, one hopes, but by suasion, proposing outcomes that neither the Danes nor the Greenlanders will want to refuse. The American nuclear umbrella is of great importance to Denmark. Even short of changing sovereignty, a U.S.-Denmark treaty can be envisioned that would cede foreign policy, base rights and resource exploitation against favorable treatment in the NATO context. As for the Greenlanders, the enormous economic benefit of opening Greenland to American capital should suffice.

Ambassador Brunson McKinley, Experienced political observer,  21 January 2025

To understand what the new administration is up to geopolitically, it may be useful to view its objectives in
four circles – the Western Hemisphere, the Northern Chain, the Circle Around China, and the Circle of
Abraham. Objectives are not accomplishments and the President’s success in all four circles is far from
guaranteed, but this analysis may help the outsider to sort out moves that might otherwise appear
random or even chaotic.
The Western Hemisphere. The base of American power in the world is its hegemony over the Western
Hemisphere, where it cannot be attacked, save with nuclear weapons, and where it is and will remain
dominant. President Trump moved immediately to update the Monroe Doctrine by offering to buy
Greenland, by suggesting that Canada join the United States and by bringing back into line smaller
countries that showed signs of insubordination. The principal addressee of this message is nonetheless
China, now put on notice that commercial dealings in the hemisphere may be allowed, but close political
ties and any kind of security arrangement are verboten. The right to exploit the resources of the Arctic is
also a factor in the renewed emphasis on the hemisphere.
The Northern Chain. By reaching out to Russia and ending the Ukraine war, President Trump has in
mind the eventual creation of a temperate and arctic zone that will circle the globe and join together the
nations of North America, Europe and North Asia institutionally and commercially. These nations in fact
emerged from common civilizational origins – Greece, Rome, christianity, the renaissance and the
industrial revolution. Détente with Russia, the currently missing link in the Northern Chain, will permit
Europe to resume purchases of cheap energy and reopen a lucrative market for its industries. It will
facilitate the negotiation of agreements among all parties for the exploitation of arctic resources and
shipping routes. It will protect Russia from the stifling embrace of China and reinforce containment of
Chinese expansion. Finally it will allow the countries of the Northern Chain to work seriously on common
policies in energy, nuclear non-proliferation, terrorism and other portfolios where their interests converge.
The Circle Around China. The ability of the U.S. to slow or even reverse the expansion of Chinese
power will depend on the resistance applied to China by its neighbors. If Russia can be brought into the
circle of containment along with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, Thailand,
Indonesia and India, the circle will be complete. China will remain by far the strongest country in Asia, but
other Asian nations will have an alternative to falling completely under China’s sway by remaining in the
U.S.-led global economic system and continuing to do business with the Northern Chain. Beijing may
aspire to the same hegemony in East Asia that the U.S. enjoys in the Western hemisphere, but the
geopolitical realities are different and a policy of containment has a good chance of working.
The Circle of Abraham. President Trump has decided to restructure the Near and Middle East around a
strong Israel. He hopes to resettle the Palestinian refugees and bury the long-dead two-state solution.
Thereafter, in the framework of the Abrahan Accords, he will broker an alliance of the Sunni states –
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the Gulf – against Iran, which in its isolation will be
compelled to conform or crack. The nations of the Northern Chain will come to support this policy, and so
no doubt will China. Certainly if Iran comes around, the end of the sanctions regime will allow China to
gain access to the Iranian petroleum that it will increasingly need. For the Sunni states of the region,
Israel can be a source of technology and financing, as well as a proven channel for influencing Western
policy.
The headlines come fast and furious every day. Now you know in which box to sort the clippings.
B. McKinley, Geneva, 20 February 2025